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
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


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AND

MORAL REFLECTIONS.

BY THE

DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULT.


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
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M A X I M S.

11-10-1900



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Tappan Park. N.Y.
6-9-1932*

TO THE

P U B L I C.

THE esteem in which the Duke de la Rochefoucault's Maxims is held, renders it unnecessary to offer any apology for presenting the public with the present edition. In justice, however, to the celebrated Author, the publisher will take the liberty to subjoin the sentiments of M. DE VOLTAIRE and LORD CHESTERFIELD. M. de Voltaire has not scrupled to assert, that these Maxims contributed more than any other work to form the taste of the French nation, and give it a true relish for propriety and correctness. "Though," says he, "there is but one truth running through the whole piece, namely, that self-love is the spring of all our actions and determinations; yet this thought presents itself under such a variety of forms, as never fail to strike with new surprise. This little collection was much read and admired; it accustomed our authors to think

“ think, and to comprise their thoughts in
 “ a lively, correct, and delicate turn of
 “ phrase; which was a merit utterly un-
 “ known to any European writer before
 “ him, since the revival of letters. His
 “ Memoirs† are still read, and his Maxims
 “ are known by heart ‡”


The Earl of Chesterfield in his Letters,
 lately published, says, “ La Rochefoucault
 “ is, I know, blamed, but I think without
 “ reason, for deriving all our actions from
 “ the source of self-love. For my own
 “ part, I see a great deal of truth, and no
 “ harm at all in that opinion. It is suf-
 “ ficient that we seek our own happiness in
 “ every thing we do; and it is as certain
 “ that we can only find it in doing well,
 “ and in conforming all our actions to the
 “ rule of right reason, which is the great
 “ law of nature. It is only a mistaken self-
 “ love that is a blameable motive, when
 “ we take the immediate and indiscriminate
 “ gratification of a passion, or appetite, for
 “ real happiness. But am I blameable, if I

† Mem. d'Anne d'Autriche.

‡ Siecle de Louis XIV.

P R E F A C E.

THE Public is here presented with a new translation of the Moral Maxims of Francis the Sixth, Duke de la Rochefoucault : a performance of such estimation, that its noble Author lived to see five or six editions of it ; and since his death it has run through as many more ; not to mention translations. As far as the two languages permit, the translator has followed, in the disposition of the Maxims, the alphabetical order of Mr. Amelot de la Housfaye : to whom he is also beholden for many well-collected authorities from the judicious Tacitus, and some other ancient writers. In his own notes he has chiefly aimed at the explanation



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AND

MORAL REFLECTIONS.

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
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M A X I M S.

06-12-24

III.

The height of ability consists in a thorough knowledge of the real value of things, and of the genius of the age we live in.

IV.

It requires no small degree of ability to know when to conceal it †.

V.

Few men are able to know all the ill they do.

VI.

There are some affairs and distempers, which ill-timed remedies make worse; and great ability is requisite to know when it is dangerous to apply them.

† Claudius Cossus, ambassador from the Swisses, was a man of known eloquence, which he knew when to conceal: and he appeased a mutiny of the soldiery by feigning a panic. Tacit.

ACCENT.

VII.

The accent of a man's native country is as strongly impressed on his mind, as on his tongue.

ACCIDENTS.

VIII.

No accidents are so unlucky, but that the prudent may draw some advantage from them: nor are there any so lucky, but what the imprudent may turn to their prejudice.

IX.

Accidents sometimes happen from which a man cannot well extricate himself without a spice of madness.

ACTIONS.

X.

Great actions, the lustre of which dazzles us, are represented by politicians as the

the effects of deep design; whereas they are commonly the effects of caprice and passion. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, supposed to be owing to their ambition to give a master to the world, arose probably from jealousy †.

XI.

Men may boast of their great actions; but they are oftener the effect of chance, than of design.

XII.

Our actions may seem to be under the influence of good or bad stars, to which they owe the praise or blame they meet with.

XIII.

How brilliant soever an action may be, it ought not to pass for great when it is not the effect of great design.

† Pliny the Historian says, that the Social War had its rise from a private quarrel, between Livius Drusus and Casio about a ring under sale, for which they bid against one another. Henshawe.

XIV.

XIV.

A certain proportion should be observed between our designs and actions, if we would reap from them the advantage they might produce.

XV.

Our actions are like the jingle of rhyme, which every one repeats in his own manner.

XVI.

We should often be ashamed of our best actions, if the world were witness to the motives which produce them. ✓

XVII.

To praise great actions with sincerity, may be said to be taking part in them.

ADVICE.

XVIII.

There is nothing of which we are so liberal as of advice.

XIX.

XIX.

Nothing is less sincere than our manner of asking and of giving advice. He who asks advice would seem to have a respectful deference for the opinion of his friend; whilst yet he only aims at getting his own approved of, and his friend responsible for his conduct. On the other hand he who gives it, repays the confidence supposed to be placed in him by a seemingly disinterested zeal, whilst he seldom means any thing by the advice he gives, but his own interest or reputation†.

XX.

There is near as much ability requisite to know how to make use of good advice, as to know how to act for one's self.

† Lord Shaftesbury, in his Soliloquy, says, 'No one was ever the better for advice: for that in general what we called giving advice, was properly taking an occasion to shew our own wisdom at another's expence; and to receive advice, was little better than tamely to afford another the occasion of raising himself a character from our defects.'

XXI.

MAXIMS.

7

XXI.

We may give advice; but we cannot give conduct.

AFFECTATION.

XXII.

We are never made so ridiculous by the qualities we have, as by those we affect to have.

XXIII.

We had better appear to be what we are, than affect to appear what we are not.

AFFLICTION.

XXIV.

Whatever we may pretend, interest and vanity are the usual sources of our afflictions.

XXV.

There are in affliction several kinds of hypocrisy. Under the pretence of weeping for the loss of one who was dear to us, we weep for ourselves: we weep over the diminution

mination of our fortune, of our pleasure, of our importance. Thus have the dead the honour of tears which stream only for the living. I call this a sort of hypocrisy, because we impose on ourselves. There is another hypocrisy, which is less innocent, because it imposes on the world. This is the affliction of such as aspire to the glory of a great and immortal sorrow: when time, which consumes all things, has worn out the grief which they really had, they still persist in their tears, lamentations, and sighs. They assume a mournful behaviour; and labour, by all their actions, to demonstrate that their affliction will not in the least abate till death. This disagreeable, this troublesome vanity, is common among ambitious women. As the sex bars all the paths to glory, they endeavour to render themselves celebrated by the ostentation of an inconsolable affliction. There is yet another species of tears, whose shallow springs easily overflow, and as easily dry away: we weep, to acquire the reputation of being tender; we weep, in order to be pitied; we weep, that we may be wept over;

MAXIMS.

ver; we even weep, to avoid the scandal of not weeping.

XXVI.

We sometimes lose friends whom we regret more than we grieve for; and others for whom we grieve, yet do not regret.

XXVII.

Most women lament not the death of their lovers so much out of real affection, as because they would appear to be the more worthy of having been beloved.

A G E.

XXVIII.

Most people as they approach old age, show in what manner their body and mind will decay †.

† To a skilful observer, the future defects of a man's mind and body may sometimes be visible from the time he is adult; as a good mechanic, from the accurate inspection of a machine, may perhaps predict where it will decay.

MAXIMS.

XXIX.

We arrive novices at the different ages of life ; and want experience, though we have had many years to gain it†.

AGREEABLENESS.

XXX.

We judge so superficially of things, that common words and actions, spoke and done in an agreeable manner, with some knowledge of what passes in the world, often succeed beyond the greatest ability‡.

† Age does not necessarily confer experience ; nor does even precept ; nor any thing but an intercourse and acquaintance with things. And we frequently see those who have wanted opportunities to indulge their juvenile passions in youth, go preposterous lengths in old age, with all the symptoms of youth except ability.

‡ How often have I seen the most solid merit and knowledge neglected, unwelcome, and even rejected ; while flimsy parts, little knowledge, and less merit, introduced by the Graces, have been received, cherished, and admired !

Ld. Chesterfield's Letters, (136th).

XXXI.

XXXI.

We may say of agreeableness, as distinct from beauty, that it is a symmetry whose rules are unknown; it is a secret conformity of the features to one another, to the complexion, to the carriage.

AMBITION.

XXXII.

The ambitious deceive themselves in proposing an end to their ambition; for that end, when attained, becomes a means.

XXXIII.

When great men suffer themselves to be subdued by the length of their misfortunes, they discover that the strength of their ambition, not of their understanding, was that which supported them. They discover too, that, allowing for a little vanity, heroes are just like other men.

XXXIV.

The greatest ambition entirely conceals
itself,

itself, when it finds that what it aspired to is unattainable.

XXXV.

What seems to be generosity is often no more than disguised ambition; which overlooks little interests, in order to gratify great ones.

XXXVI.

Moderation must not claim the merit of combating and conquering ambition; for they can never exist in the same subject. Moderation is the languor and sloth of the soul; ambition its activity and ardour.

XXXVII.

We pass often from love to ambition; but we seldom return from ambition to love.

APPLICATION.

XXXVIII.

Those who apply themselves too much to little things, commonly become incapable of great ones.

XXXIX.

XXXIX.

Few things are impracticable in themselves; and it is for want of application, rather than of means, that men fail of success.

APPEARANCE.

XL.

In every profession, every individual affects to appear what he would willingly be esteemed: so that we may say, The world is composed of nothing but appearances.

AVARICE.

XLI.

Misers mistake gold for their good; whereas it is only a mean of attaining it †.

That there is such an irrational avarice as confines itself to the mere satisfaction arising from heaping up, looking at, and touching gold and silver, without any regard to their use, every age furnishes us with too many examples, to admit a doubt.

XLII.

XLII.

Avarice is more opposite to economy than liberality.

XLIII.

Extreme avarice almost always makes mistakes. There is no passion that oftener misses its aim; nor on which the present has so much influence, in prejudice of the future.

XLIV.

Avarice often produces contrary effects. There are many people who sacrifice their whole fortunes to dubious and distant expectations; there are others who condemn great future for little present advantages.

BENEFITS.

XLV.

We like better to see those on whom we confer benefits, than those from whom we receive them.

XLVI.

Men are not only apt to forget benefits and injuries; but even to hate those who have

have obliged them, and to cease to hate those who have injured them. (The very attention to requite kindnesſes, and revenge wrongs, ſeems to be an inſupportable ſlavery†.)

XLVII.

Every body takes pleaſure in returning ſmall obligations; many go ſo far as to acknowledge moderate ones; but there is hardly any one who does not repay great obligations with ingratitude.

BUSINESS.

XLVIII.

The ruſt of buſineſs is ſometimes poliſhed off in a camp; but never in a court.

† ‘To have received from one greater benefits than there is hope to requite, diſpoſeth to counterfeit love, but really to ſecret hatred; and puts a man into the eſtate of a deſperate debtor, who, in declining the ſight of his creditor, tacitly wiſheth him there where he might never ſee him more. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thralldom, and unrequitable obligations perpetual thralldom; which is hateful.’ *Leviathan*, p. 48.

D

CIVILITY.

CIVILITY.

XLIX.

Civility is a desire to receive civility,
and to be accounted well-bred.

CLEMENCY,

I.

The clemency of princes is often policy,
to gain the affection of their subjects.

II.

That clemency we make a virtue of pro-
ceeds sometimes from vanity, sometimes
from indolence, often from fear, and almost
always from a mixture of all three.

CONDUCT.

LII.

That conduct often seems ridiculous,
the

the secret reasons of which are wise and solid†.

LIII.

A man often imagines he acts, when he is acted upon; and while his mind aims at one thing, his heart insensibly gravitates towards another.

† That of L. J. Brutus, for example, whose father and eldest brother Tarquin having murdered, he counterfeited himself a fool; in order to escape the same danger. Tarquin thinking his folly real, despised the man; and having possessed himself of his estate, kept him as an idiot, merely with a view of making sport for his children. At the death of Lucretia, Brutus, happening to be present, threw off the mask: he drew the poniard reeking from her wound, and lifting it up towards heaven; ‘Be witness, ye gods,’ he cried, ‘that from this moment I proclaim myself the avenger of the chaste Lucretia’s death; from this moment I profess myself the enemy of Tarquin.’—An amazement seized the hearers!—In the sequel Tarquin was expelled, and Brutus was proclaimed deliverer of the people.

CONFIDENCE.

LIV.

In conversation confidence has a greater share than wit.

LV.

The desire of being pitied, or admired, is commonly the true reason of our confidence.

CONSTANCY.

LVI.

The constancy of the wife is only the art of keeping their disquietudes to themselves.

LVII.

We all bear the misfortunes of other people with an heroic constancy.

LVIII.

Criminals at their execution affect sometimes a constancy, and contempt of death, which is, in fact, nothing more than the
fear

fear of facing it. Their constancy may be said to be to the mind, what the fillet is to their eyes.

LIX.

Constancy in love is perpetual inconstancy: it attaches us successively to all the good qualities of the person beloved, giving sometimes the preference to one, sometimes to another. So that this constancy is no more than inconstancy confined to a single object.

LX.

In love there are two sorts of constancy: one arises from our continually finding in the favourite object fresh motives to love; the other from our making it a point of honour to be constant.

LXI.

In misfortunes we often mistake dejection for constancy: we bear them, without daring to look on them; as cowards suffer themselves to be killed, without resistance.

CON-

CONTEMPT.

LXII.

We sometimes condemn the present by praising the past; we shew our contempt of what now is, by our esteem for what is no more†.

LXIII.

None but the contemptible are apprehensive of contempt.

CONVERSATION.

LXIV.

One reason why we meet with so few people who are reasonable and agreeable in conversation is, that there is scarce any body who does not think more of what he has to say, than of answering what is said to him. Even those who have the most address and politeness think they do enough if they only seem to be attentive; at the same time their eyes and their minds betray a distraction as to what is addressed.

† I believe there was such a thing on earth as obasity in Saturn's reign, says Juvenal.

to them, and an impatience to return to what they themselves were saying: not reflecting that to be thus studious of pleasing themselves is but a poor way of pleasing or convincing others; and that to hear patiently, and answer precisely, are the great perfections of conversation †.

COPIES.

LEV.

The only good copies are those which point out the ridicule of bad originals.

† “ I must not omit one thing—which is attention : an attention never to be wholly engrossed by any past or future object, but instantly to be directed to the present one, be it what it will—An absent man can make but few observations—he can pursue nothing steadily, because his absences make him lose his way. They are very disagreeable, and hardly to be tolerated in old age ; but in youth they cannot be forgiven.”

Ld. Chesterfield's Letters, (195th).

COQUETRY.

LXVI.

It is a sort of coquetry, to boast that we never coquet.

LXVII.

All women are coquettes, though all do not practise coquetry; some are restrained by fear, some by reason.

LXVIII.

Women are not aware of the extent of their coquetry.

LXIX.

Women find it more difficult to get the better of their coquetry than of their love.

LXX.

The greatest miracle of love is the reformation of a coquette.

LXXI.

We are always afraid of appearing before

fore the person we love when we have been coquetting elsewhere †.

LXXII.

Coquettes take a pride in appearing to be jealous of their lovers, in order to conceal their being envious of other women.

CRIMES.

LXXIII.

There are crimes which become innocent, and even glorious through their splendor, number, and excess: hence it is, that public theft is called address; and to seize unjustly on provinces, to make conquests †.

† Coquettes are those who studiously excite the passion of love; though they mean nothing less than to gratify it. The male coquettes are near as numerous as the female.

† Power is the justice of sovereigns: it is for private persons to preserve their own, but for princes to seize what belongs to others.

To ravage, plunder, and murder, is to reign; to desolate a country, is to pacify it, Tacit.

LXXIV.

We easily forget crimes that are known only to ourselves †.

LXXV.

There are people of whom we never believe ill till we see it: but there are none we ought to be surprised at when we do see it.

LXVI.

Those who are themselves incapable of great crimes are not ready to suspect others of them.

CUNNING.

LXXVII.

The greatest of all cunning is, to seem blind to the snares laid for us; men are

† Most people fancy themselves innocent of those crimes of which they cannot be convicted. Senec.

The English have a law maxim, *Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare*, No man is legally compellable to accuse himself.

never

never so easily deceived as while they are endeavouring to deceive others †.

LXXVIII.

Those who have most cunning for ever affect to condemn cunning, that they may make use of it on some great occasion, and to some great end.

LXXIX.

The common practise of cunning is no sign of genius; it almost always happens that those who use it to cover themselves in one place, lay themselves open in another.

LXXX.

Cunning and treachery proceed from want of capacity.

LXXXI.

The sure way to be cheated is, to fancy ourselves more cunning than others.

† The best defence against a secret enemy is, to make him believe you are not aware of his snares.

Tacit.

LXXXII.

We are angry with those who trick us because they appear to have more wit than ourselves.

LXXXIII.

One man may be more cunning than another, but not more cunning than all the world.

LXXXIV.

Those who are deceived by our cunning appear not near so ridiculous to us, as we seem to ourselves when deceived by the cunning of others.

CURIOSITY.

LXXXV.

There are two kinds of curiosity. One arises from interest, which makes us desirous to learn what may be useful to us ;
the

the other from pride, which makes us desire to know what others are ignorant of†.

DEATH.

LXXXVL.

Few people are well acquainted with death. It is generally submitted to through stupidity and custom, not resolution: most men die merely because they cannot help it.

LXXXVII.

Death and the fun are not to be looked at steadily.

† "Curiosity," says Hobbes, "is a desire to know why (and how; such as is in no living creature but man; so that man is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion, from other animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure."

Leviathan, p. 26.

LXXXVIII.

LXXXVIII.

After having spoken of the falsity of seeming virtues, it is proper to say something about the falsity of the contempt of death: I mean that contempt of death which the heathens boasted to derive from their natural strength, unsupported by the hopes of a better life. There is a wide difference between suffering death courageously, and contemning it; the one is common enough; but the other, I believe, never sincere. Every thing has been written that can persuade us that death is no evil; and some of the weakest as well as the greatest of men have given celebrated examples in confirmation of this tenet. Yet I doubt whether any person of good sense ever believed it; and the pains we take to persuade ourselves and others of it plainly evince that it is no easy task. A man may, for many reasons, be disgusted with life; but he can have no reason for contemning death. Even suicides esteem it no slight matter, and are as much startled at it, and decline

decline it as much as other people, when it comes in any other shape except that which they have chosen. The remarkable inequality in the courage of many valiant men proceeds from death's appearing differently to their imaginations, and seeming more instant at one time than another. By this means it happens, that, after having condemned what they did not know, they are at last afraid of what they do know. We must avoid considering death in all its circumstances, if we would not think it the greatest of all ills. The wisest and bravest are those who make the best pretences for not considering it at all : for every one that views it in its proper light will find it sufficiently terrible. The necessity of dying made the whole of philosophic fortitude. The philosophers thought it best to do that with a good grace which was not to be avoided ; and, being unable to make themselves immortal, they did all they could to immortalize their reputations, and save what they might out of the general wreck. To be able to put a good face on the matter, let us by no means discover even to ourselves all we think about it ; let us trust rather to constitution, than

to those vain reasonings which make us believe we can approach death with indifference. The glory of dying resolutely, the hopes of being regretted, the desire of leaving a fair reputation, the assurance of being delivered from the miseries of life, and freed from the caprice of fortune, are alleviating reflections, not to be rejected: but we must by no means imagine them infallible. These serve indeed to embolden us, just as in war a poor hedge emboldens the soldiers to approach an incessant firing. At a distance, they view it as a shelter; when they come up, they find it but a sorry defence. We flatter ourselves too much in fancying that death, when near, will appear what we judged it to be when distant; and that our opinions, which are weakness itself, will be firm enough not to give way on this severest of trials. We must also be but ill acquainted with the effects of self-love, to imagine that that will permit us to think lightly of an action which must necessarily be its destruction. Reason, from whom we expect mighty assistance, is too feeble, on this occasion, to make us believe what we wish to find true. It is she, on the contrary, who betrays us; and, instead of inspiring a contempt

tempt of death, helps only to discover its horrors. Indeed all she can do for us is, to advise us to avert our eyes, and fix them on some other object. Cato and Brutus chose noble one. A footman, sometime since, amused himself with dancing upon the scaffold he was going to be broken on. Thus different motives sometimes produce the same effect. And so true it is, that whatever disproportion there may be, between the great and the vulgar, we often see them meet death with the same countenance: but there is always this difference, that the contempt of death shewn by heroes is owing to their love of glory, which hides it from their sight; and in common people it proceeds merely from their want of sensibility, which prevents their being aware of the greatness of the evil, and leaves them at liberty to think of something else†.

D E C E I T.

LXXXIX.

To be deceived by our enemies, and betrayed by our friends, is not to be borne;
yet

† The contempt of death has been always very justly accounted a virtue of the first class. Virgil makes

yet are we often content to be served so by ourselves.

XC.

It is as easy to deceive ourselves without our perceiving it, as it is difficult to deceive others without their perceiving it.

XCI.

A resolution never to deceive exposes a man to be deceived himself.

makes it (as it truly is) essential to the character of a happy man.

“*Quique metus omnes, & inexorabile fatum,
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.*”

He must be superior to every fear; even that of death, and its consequences.—The fear of death is peculiar to man; and may perhaps be a necessary instinct to counterbalance reason, which might else, too frequently, prompt him to quit his post: according to that noble thought of Lucan.

“*Victurosq; dei celant, ut vivere durent,
Felix esse mori.*”

The gods conceal from men the happiness of death, that they may endure life.

XCII.

XCII.

Dulness is sometimes a sufficient security against the attack of an artful man.

XCIII.

He who imagines he can do without the world deceives himself much; but he who fancies the world cannot do without him, is still more mistaken.

XCIV.

In love, the deceit almost always outstrips the distrust.

XCV.

We are sometimes less unhappy in being deceived, than in being undeceived by those we love.

XCVI.

Should even our friends deceive us, though we have a right to be indifferent to their professions of friendship, we ought

ever to retain a sensibility for their misfortunes.

D E C E N C Y.

XCVII.

Decency is the least of all laws, but the most strictly observed.

D E S I R E.

XCVIII.

It is much easier to suppress a first desire, than to satisfy those that follow.

XCIX.

Before we passionately wish for any thing, we should examine into the happiness of its possessor.

C.

Were we perfectly acquainted with the
object,

object, we should never passionately desire it †.

DISGUISE.

CI.

Were we to take as much pains to be what we ought, as we do to disguise what we are, we might appear like ourselves, without being at the trouble of any disguise at all.

CIF.

We were so used to disguise ourselves to others, that at last we become disguised even to ourselves.

CIII.

Some disguised falsehoods are so like truths, that it would be judging ill not to be deceived by them.

† Sir Thomas More says, “the world is undone
“ by looking at things at a distance.

DIS-

DISTRUST.

CIV.

Our own distrust justifies the deceit of others†.

CV.

That which commonly hinders us from shewing the openness of our hearts to friends, is not so much a distrust of them, as of ourselves.

CVI.

Whatever distrust we may have of the sincerity of other people we always believe that they are more ingenuous with ourselves than any body else.

E A S E.

CVII.

A man who finds not satisfaction in himself seeks for it in vain elsewhere.

† Many men provoke others to over-reach them by excessive suspicion; their extraordinary distrust in some sort justifying the deceit. Senec. ep. iii.

E D U.

EDUCATION.

CVIII.

Common education instils into young people a second self-love.

ELOQUENCE.

CIX.

There is as much eloquence in the tone of voice, in the look, and in the gesture of an orator, as in the choice of his words†.

GX.

† “The receipt to make a speaker, and an applauded one too, is short and easy. Take common sense quantum sufficit, add a little application to the rules and orders of the House [of Commons], throw obvious thoughts in a new light, and make up the whole with a large quantity of purity, correctness, and elegance of style. Take it for granted that by far the greatest part of mankind neither analyse nor search to the bottom; they are incapable of penetrating deeper than the surface.” *Ld. Chesterf. Lett.* (272d.)

“The

CX.

True eloquence consists in saying all that is proper, and nothing more.

EMPLOYMENT.

CXI.

It is easier to appear worthy of the employments we are not possessed of, than of those we are.

CXII.

We may appear great in an employment below our merit; but we often appear little in one that is too high for us.

ENVY.

"The manner of your speaking is full as important as the matter, as more people have ears to be tickled than understandings to judge."

Id. Lett. 197th.

ENVY.

CXIII.

Those who endeavour to imitate us we like much better than those who endeavour to equal us. Imitation is a sign of esteem but competition of envy.

CXIV.

We often glory in the most criminal passions: but the passion of envy is so shameful, that we never dare to own it.

✓

CXV.

Jealousy is, in some sort, rational and just; it aims at the preservation of a good which belongs, or which at least we think belongs to us; whereas envy is a frenzy, that cannot bear the good of others,

CXVI.

Our approbation of those who are entering upon the world is often owing to a secret envy of those who are well settled in it.

G

CXVII.

MAXIMS.

CXVII.

Pride, which excites envy, often helps us to moderate it.

CXVIII.

Envy is more irreconcilable than hatred.

CXIX.

Envy is destroyed by true friendship, and coquetry by true love.

CXX.

Our envy always outlives the felicity of its object.

CXXI.

More people are free from interest, than from envy.

EXAMPLE.

CXXII.

Nothing is so contagious as examples: never is any considerable good or ill done that

MAXIMS.

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that does not produce its like. We imitate good actions through emulation; and bad ones through a malignity in our nature, which shame concealed, and example sets at liberty.

FAMILIARITY.

CXXIII.

Familiarity is a suspension of almost all the laws of civility; libertinism has introduced it into society under the notion of ease.

FAVOURITES.

CXXIV.

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The hatred of favourites is nothing more than the love of favour. Our indignation at not possessing it ourselves is soothed and mitigated by the contempt we express for those who do; and we refuse them our homage, because we are not able to deprive them of that which procures them the homage of every one else.

G 2

FAULTS.

F A U L T S.

CXXV.

We need not be much concerned about those faults which we have the courage to own.

CXXVI.

We acknowledge our faults, in order to repair by sincerity, the hurt they do us in the opinion of others.

CXXVII.

We confess small faults in order to insinuate that we have no great ones.

CXXVIII.

A great genius will sincerely acknowledge his defects as well as his perfections: it is a weakness not to own the ill as well as the good that is in us.

CXXIX.

Had we no faults ourselves, we should take less pleasure in observing those of others.

CXXX.

CXXX.

We are often more agreeable through our faults, than through our good qualities.

CXXXI.

The greatest faults are those of Great Men.

CXXXII.

Dishonest men conceal their faults from themselves as well as others: honest men know and confess them.

CXXXIII.

There are some faults which, when well managed, make a greater figure than virtue itself.

CXXXIV.

We are not bold enough to say in general that we have no faults, and that our enemies have no good qualities; but in particulars we seem to think so.

CXXXV.

CXXXV.

We have few faults that are not more excusable in themselves than the means we use to conceal them.

CXXXVI.

We boast of faults that are the opposites to those we really have; thus, if we are irresolute, we glory in being thought obstinate.

CXXXVII.

We easily excuse in our friends those faults that do not affect us.

CXXXVIII.

We endeavour to get reputation by those faults we determine not to amend.

CXXXIX.

It seems as if men thought they had not faults enough, for they increase their number by certain affected singularities; these are cultivated so carefully, that at last they become

come natural defects, beyond their power to reform.

F E A R.

CXL.

Few cowards know the extent of their fears.

F I D E L I T Y.

CXLI.

The fidelity of most men is one of the arts of self-love, to procure confidence. It is the means to raise us above others, by making us the depositaries of momentous concerns.

CXLI.

It is more difficult to be faithful to a mistress when on good terms with her, than when on bad.

F L A T T E R Y.

FLATTERY.

CXLIH.

We should have but little pleasure were we never to flatter ourselves.

CXLIV.

Did we not flatter ourselves, the flattery of others could never hurt us†.

CXLV.

Flattery is a sort of bad money, to which our vanity gives currency.

CXLVI.

Men sometimes think they hate flattery; but they hate only the manner of it.

FOLLY.

CXLVII.

Folly attends us close through life. If any one seems to be wise, it is merely be

† People flatter us, because they can depend on our credulity. Tacit.

cause

MAXIMS.

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cause his follies are proportionate to his age and fortune.

CXLVIII.

He who lives without folly is not so wise as he imagines.

CXLIX.

As we grow old, we grow more foolish and more wise.

CL.

It is great folly to affect to be wise by one's self.

CLI.

Some follies are like contagious distempers.

CLII.

Old fools are more foolish than young ones.

CLIII.

There are people fated to be fools ; they
H not

not only commit follies by choice, but are even constrained to do so by fortune.

CLIV.

No fools are so troublesome as those who have some wit.

FORTUNE.

CLV.

Whatever difference may appear in mens fortunes, there is nevertheless a certain compensation of good and ill, that makes all equal †.

CLVI.

Fortune turns every thing to the advantage of her favourites.

CLVII.

The happiness and misery of men depend no less on temper than fortune.

† A great fortune runs great risques; a moderate one is secure. Tacit.

Many who seem wretched are happy; and many are miserable in the midst of riches. Id.

CLVIII.

CLVIII.

Fortune breaks us of many faults which reason cannot.

CLIX.

The generality of people judge of us by our reputation, or fortune.

CLX.

To be great, we must know how to push our fortune to the utmost.

CLXI.

Fortune exhibits our virtues and vices, as the light shews objects.

CLXII.

Fortune is ever deemed blind by those on whom she bestows no favours.

CLXIII.

To be able to answer for what we shall certainly do, we should be able to answer for our fortune.

CLXIV.

We should manage our fortune like our
H 2. con-

constitution ; enjoy it when good, have patience when bad, and never apply violent remedies but in cases of necessity.

CLXV.

Fortune and caprice govern the world.

FRIENDSHIP.

CLXVI.

What is commonly called friendship is no more than a partnership ; a reciprocal regard for one another's interest, and an exchange of good offices ; in a word, a mere traffic, wherein self-love always proposes to be a gainer.

CLXVII.

Though most of the friendships of the world ill deserve the name of friendships ; yet a man may make use of them occasionally, as of a traffic whose returns are uncertain, and in which it is usual to be cheated.

CLXVIII.

In the distress of our best friends we always

ways find something that does not dis-
please us †.

CLXIX.

The reason we are so changeable in our friendships is, that it is difficult to know the qualities of the heart, and easy to know those of the head.

† This maxim gave occasion to the celebrated Verses on the death of Dr. Swift. The introductory lines of the poem give the Dean's opinion of our author, and a poetical version of the maxim. They are as follows :

As Rochefoucault his maxims drew
From nature, I believe them true :
They argue no corrupted mind
In him : the fault is in mankind.

This maxim, more than all the rest,
Is thought too base for human breast :

“ In all distresses of our friends,

“ We first consult our private ends

“ While Nature, kindly bent to ease us,

“ Points out some circumstance to please us.”

Swift, Vol. VI.

See also Lord Chesterfield's defence of this maxim, Letter 129th.

CLXX.

We love nothing but on our own account, and only follow our taste and inclination when we prefer our friends to ourselves; and yet it is this preference that alone constitutes true and perfect friendship.

CLXXI.

It is more dishonourable to distrust a friend, than to be deceived by him.

CLXXII.

We often imagine we love men in power; but interest alone is the true reason of our friendship for them: we espouse not their party to do them good, but from their hands to receive good.

CLXXIII.

Self-love magnifies, or diminishes, the good qualities of our friends, in proportion to the satisfaction we take in them: and we judge of their merit by the terms they keep with us.

CLXXIV.

CLXXIV.

We sometimes lightly complain of our friends, to be beforehanded in justifying our own levity.

CLXXV.

We are not much afflicted at the misfortunes of our friends, when they give us an opportunity of signalizing our affection for them.

CLXXVI.

We are fond of exaggerating the love our friends bear us; but it is often less from a principle of gratitude, than the desire of prejudicing people in favour of our own merit.

CLXXVII.

We always love those who admire us; but we do not always love those whom we admire.

CLXXVIII.

Rare as true love is, it is less so than true friendship.

CLXXIX.

CLXXIX.

The reason why few women give into friendship is, that friendship is insipid to those who have experienced love.

CLXXX.

In friendship, as in love, we are often happier through our ignorance, than knowledge.

CLXXXI.

It is very difficult to love those we do not esteem; and it is at least as difficult to love those whom we esteem much more than we do ourselves.

CLXXXII.

We are much nearer loving those who hate us, than those who love us more than we desire.

CLXXXIII.

The greatest effort of friendship is, not the discovery of our faults to a friend, but the endeavouring to make him see his own.

CLXXXIV.

CLXXXIV.

The charm of novelty, and long habit, opposite as they are, equally conceal from us the faults of our friends.

CLXXXV.

The generality of friends put us out of conceit with friendship; as the generality of religious people put us out of conceit with religion.

CLXXXVI.

Nothing is more natural, nor more fallacious, than a belief that we are beloved.

CLXXXVII.

Renewed friendships require more conduct than those that have never been broken.

GALLANTRY.

CLXXXVIII.

Though there are many women who never have had one intrigue; there are scarce any who have had no more than one.

CLXXXIX.

We seldom talk of a woman's first intrigue before she has had a second.

CXC.

Love is the smallest part of gallantry.

G L O R Y.

CXCI.

The glory of great men ought always to be rated according to the means used to acquire it.

CXCH.

We exalt the reputation of some, to depress that of others; nor should we always extol so much the prince of Conde and Marshal Turenne, had we not a mind to blame both.

EXCHII.

It is as commendable to be proud with respect to one's self, as ridiculous to be so with respect to others †.

† One of Pythagoras's precepts was, "Above all things reverence yourself."

CXCIV.

CXCIV.

We are unwilling to lose our lives, and yet would fain acquire glory. Hence it is, that the brave use more dexterity to avoid death, than men versed in the chicanery of law do to preserve their estates.

GOODNESS.

CXCV.

Nothing is more rare than true goodness; even those who imagine they possess it having nothing more than complaisance, or weakness.

CXCVI.

It is very difficult to distinguish diffusive general goodness from great address.

CXCVII.

None deserve the name of good, who have not spirit enough, at least, to be bad: goodness being for the most part but indolence, or impotence†.

† Caprice is also, as Mr. Pope has observed, sometimes a source of goodness;

“And made a widow happy for a whim.”

CXCVIII.

A fool has not stuff enough to make a good man.

CXCIX.

Resolute people alone can be truly good-natured; such as commonly seem so are weak and easily soured.

GOOD SENSE.

CC.

Good sense should be the test of all rules, both ancient and modern: whatever is incompatible with good sense is false.

GOVERN.

CCI.

It is more difficult to prevent being governed, than to govern others †.

† Tacitus says of Agricola, that he governed his family; which many find a harder task than to govern a province.

GREAT

GREAT MEN.

CCII.

Since great men cannot bestow health of body, nor peace of mind, we certainly pay too dear for all that they can bestow.

GRAVITY.

CCIII.

Gravity is a mysterious carriage of the body, invented to cover the defects of the mind †.

† “The Duke de Rochefoucault’s definition of gravity,” says Sterne, “deserves to be written in letters of gold.”—Yorick had been speaking to this effect:—Gravity is an errant scoundrel, and of the most dangerous kind too, because a sly one; and more honest well-meaning people are bubbled out of their goods and money by it in one twelve-month, than by pocket-picking and shop-lifting in seven. The very essence of gravity is design, and consequently deceit: a taught trick to gain credit of the world for more sense and knowledge than a man is worth.”

Trist. Shand, Vol. I. ch. xi.

“Gravity is of the very essence of imposture.”

Shaftesb. Charact. Vol. I. p. 11.

GRACE.

GRACE.

CCIV.

A good grace is to the body what good sense is to the mind†.

GREEDINESS.

CCV.

An able man will arrange his interests, and conduct each in its proper order. Our greediness often hurts us, by making us prosecute so many things at once; by too earnestly desiring the less considerable, we lose the more important.

† “ They are both the gifts of nature; but they
 “ may be cultivated, increased; and brought to per-
 “ fection. Adorn yourself with all those graces and
 “ accomplishments which without solidity are frivo-
 “ lous; but without which, solidity is to a great de-
 “ gree useless,”

Ld. Chesterf. Lett. (182.)†

GR A.

GRATITUDE.

CCVL.

It is with gratitude as with honesty among traders, it helps to carry on business; and we pay, not because we ought, but in order to find easier credit another time.

CCVII.

Not all who discharge their debts of gratitude should flatter themselves that they are grateful.

CCVIII.

The reason of the misreckoning in expected returns of gratitude is, that the pride of the giver and receiver can never agree about the value of the obligation.

CCIX.

There is a certain warmth of gratitude, which not only acquits us of favours received, but even, while we are repaying our friends what we owed, makes them our debtors.

CCX.

CCX.

The gratitude of most men is only a secret desire to receive greater favours.

HAPPINESS.

CCXI.

None are either so happy or so unhappy as they imagine.

CCXII.

We take less pains to be happy, than to appear so.

CCXIII.

Happiness is in the taste; not in the thing; and we are made happy by possessing what we ourselves love, not what others think lovely.

HATRED.

CCXIV.

When our hatred is violent, it sinks us even beneath those we hate†.

† Tacitus says, That men hate those they injure: And the Italian Maxim is, "Chi offende non perdona mai;" Those who injure you, never forgive you.

HEART.

MAXIMS.

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HEART.

CCXV.

Every body speaks well of his heart, but no one dares to speak well of his head.

CCXVI.

Men are sometimes well acquainted with their head, when they are not so with their heart.

CCXVII.

The head is always the dupe of the heart †.

CCXVIII.

The head cannot long act the part of the heart.

† Many could have said in a round period, that whatever reflections the mind may make, and whatever resolutions it may take to reform its irregularities, the first motion of the heart overturns all its projects. But the Duke de la Rochefoucault alone can say all this in a word, "the head is always the dupe of the heart." *Bonhours l'Art de Penser.*

K

CCXIX.

CCXIX.

The imagination cannot invent so many contrarieties as are naturally in the heart of man.

HEROES.

CCXX.

Nature may give very great advantages; but she must have the concurrence of fortune to make heroes.

CCXXI.

There are heroes in ill, as well as in good.

HONOUR.

CCXXII.

One acquired honour is surety for more.

HOPE.

CCXXIII.

Hope, deceitful as it is, carries us agreeably through life †.

† It does more; it extends its influence beyond the grave; and helps us to reconcile us to the stroke of death.

‡ "Hope travels thro' nor quits us when we die."

Pope.

HUMOUR.

HUMOUR.

CCXXIV.

Our own caprice is more extravagant than the caprice of fortune.

CCXXV.

Fancy sets the value on the gifts of fortune.

CCXXVI.

Our humour is more in fault than our understanding.

CCXXVII.

We may say of the temper of men, as of most buildings, that it has several aspects; of which some are very agreeable, some disagreeable.

CCXXVIII.

The humours of the body have a regular stated course which insensibly influences the will; they circulate, and successively exercise a secret power over us. In short,

K 2.

they

they have a considerable share in all our actions, though we perceive it not.

CCXXIX.

Madmen and fools see every thing through the medium of humour.

CCXXX.

The calm or disquiet of our temper depends not so much on affairs of moment, as on the disposition of the trifles that daily occur.

HYPOCRISY.

CCXXXI.

Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue.

IDLENESS.

CCXXXII.

It is a mistake to imagine, that the violent passions only, such as ambition and love, can triumph over the rest. Idleness, languid as it is, often masters them all ; she indeed

MAXIMS.

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indeed influences all our designs and actions, and insensibly consumes and destroys both passions and virtues.

CCXXXIII.

Idleness, timidity, and shame, often keep us within the bounds of duty; whilst virtue seems to run away with the honour.

CCXXXIV.

Idleness is more in the mind than in the body.

JEALOUSY.

CCXXXV.

Under some circumstances it may not be disagreeable to a man to have a jealous wife; for she will always be talking of what pleases him.

CCXXXVI.

Only such persons who avoid giving jealousy are deserving of it.

CCXXXVII.

CCXXXVII.

Jealousy is always born with love, but does not always die with it.

CCXXXVIII.

Jealousy is nourished by doubt ; it either becomes madness, or ceases as soon as we arrive at certainty.

CCXXXIX.

In jealousy there is less love than self-love †.

CCXL.

There is a species of love whose excess prevents jealousy.

CCXLI.

Jealousy is the greatest of evils, and the least pitied by those who occasion it.

† Witness Rhadamistus, who threw his beloved wife into a river, that she might not fall into the hands of another. Tacit.

ILL S.

MAXIMS.

ILLIS.

CCXLI.

Philosophy easily triumphs over past and future ills; but present ills triumph over philosophy.

CCXLII.

The good we have received from a man should make us bear with the ill he does us.

CCXLIV.

It is less dangerous to do ill to most men, than to do them too much good †.

CCXLV.

A readiness to believe ill without examination is the effect of pride and laziness. We are willing to find people guilty, and unwilling to be at the trouble of examining into the accusation.

† When benefits are such as can never be repaid, the benefactor is usually hated instead of thanked.

Tacit.

CCXLVI.

CCXLVI.

Weakness often gets the better of those
ills which reason could not.

INCONSTANCY.

CCXLVII.

There is an inconstancy that proceeds
from the levity or weakness of the mind,
which makes it give into every one's opi-
nions: and there is another inconstancy,
more excusable, which arises from satiety.

INGRATITUDE.

CCXLVIII.

An extraordinary haste to discharge an
obligation is a sort of ingratitude.

CCXLIX.

There are some ungrateful people who
are less to be blamed for their ingratitude
than their benefactors.

CCL.

We seldom find people ungrateful so
long

MAXIMS.

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As long as we are in a condition to serve them.

CCLI.

It is no great misfortune to oblige ungrateful people, but an insupportable one to be forced to be under an obligation to a scoundrel.

INFIDELITY.

CCLII.

Women in love more easily forgive great indiscretions than small infidelities.

CCLIII.

We find it more difficult to overlook the least infidelity to ourselves than the greatest to others.

INNOCENCE.

CCLIV.

Innocence finds not near so much protection as guilt.

L

INTE.

INTEREST.

CCLV.

Interest speaks all languages, and acts all parts, even that of disinterestedness itself.

CCLVI.

Interest, which blinds some people, enlightens others.

CCLVII.

The name of virtue is as servicable to interest as vice.

CCLVIII.

Interest puts in motion all the virtues and vices.

CCLIX.

Good-nature, that boaster of its great sensibility, is often ruled by the smallest interest.

CCLX.

We condemn vice, and extol virtue, merely through interest.

CCLXI.

CELXI.

It is only in little interests that we usually venture to disbelieve appearances.

INTREPIDITY.

CCLXII.

Intrepidity is an extraordinary strength of soul, that renders it superior to the trouble, disorder, and emotion, which the appearance of danger is apt to excite. By this quality heroes maintain their tranquillity, and preserve the free use of their reason, in the most surprizing and dreadful accidents.

JUDGMENT.

CCLXIII.

Every one complains of the badness of his memory, but nobody of his judgment.

MAXIMS.

JUSTICE.

CCLXIV.

The love of justice in most men, is the fear of suffering by injustice.

KNOWLEDGE.

CCLXV.

To know things well, we should know them in detail; and as that is in a manner infinite, our knowledge is always superficial and imperfect.

LIBERALITY.

CCLXVI.

What we call liberality is seldom more than the vanity of giving; we are fonder of the vanity than the generosity of the action.

LOVE.

CCLXVII.

No disguise can long conceal love where it is, nor feign it where it is not.

CCLXVIII.

COLXVIII.

Since it is not in our power to love any more than to let it alone, a lover has no right to complain of his mistress's inconstancy, nor she of her lover's levity.

CCLXIX.

It is difficult to define love; we may say of it, however, that in the soul it is a desire to reign, in minds it is a sympathy, and in bodies a secret inclination to enjoy what we love after many difficulties †.

CCLXX.

To judge of love by most of its effects, one would think it more like hatred than kindness.

† This is surely but a dark confused account of love; and hardly will any one cry out after having read it, *Nunc scio quid sit amor*. Mr Hobbes has thus defined it in much fewer words: "It is, says he, the love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved. And the same, with fear that the love is not mutual, is jealousy." *Leviathan*.

CCLXXI.

CCLXXI.

There are few people who are not ashamed of their amours when the fit is over.

CCLXXII.

There is only one sort of love, but there are a thousand different copies of it.

CCLXXIII.

Love, like fire, cannot subsist without continual motion; it ceases to exist, as soon as it ceases to hope or fear.

CCLXXIV.

Love lends his name to many a correspondence wherein he is no more concerned than the doge in what is done at Venice.

CCLXXV.

The more you love your mistress, the readier you are to hate her.

CCLXXVI.

CCLXXVI.

To love is the least fault of the woman who has abandoned herself to love †.

CCLXXVII.

There are people who would never have been in love, had they never heard talk of it.

CCLXXVIII.

The pleasure of loving is, to love; and we are much happier in the passion we feel, than in that we excite.

CCLXXIX.

To fall in love is much easier than to get rid of it.

† Single vices make men commit single crimes; but one vice makes women guilty of all. And the reason of it is, the general contempt and ill usage that custom has made the consequence of the forfeiture of female virtue. For women, finding themselves irrecoverably undone by such a slip, and treated as if nothing could be added to their guilt, stick afterwards at no one crime, because they know they are thought capable of all.

CCLXXX.

CCLXXX.

Novelty to love is like the bloom to fruit: it gives a lustre, which is easily effaced, but never returns.

CCLXXXI.

It is impossible to love those a second time whom we have really ceased to love.

CCLXXXII.

We forgive as long as we love.

CCLXXXIII.

In love, we often doubt of what we most believe.

CCLXXXIV.

The man who thinks he loves his mistress for her sake is much mistaken.

CCLXXXV.

Young women who would not appear coquets, and old men who would not be ridiculous, should never speak of love as of a thing that in any ways concerns them.

CCLXXXVI.

CCLXXXVI.

A woman keeps her first lover long, if she happens not to take a second.

CCLXXXVII.

In love, those who are first cured are best cured.

CCLXXXVIII.

All the passions make us commit faults; but love makes us guilty of the most ridiculous ones.

CCLXXXIX.

In the old age of love, as in that of life, we continue to live to pain, though we cease to live to pleasure.

CCXC.

There are many cures for love; but not one of them infallible.

CCXCI.

Love, all agreeable as he is, pleases yet more by the manner in which he shews himself.

CCXCII.

A lover never sees the faults of his mistress till the enchantment is over.

MAGNANIMITY.

CCXCIII.

Magnanimity contemns all, to obtain all.

CCXCIV.

Magnanimity is sufficiently defined by its name; yet we may say of it, that it is the good sense of pride, and the noblest way of acquiring applause.

M A N.

CCXCV.

To study men, is more necessary than to study books †.

CCXCVI.

† The proper study of mankind is man," says Mr. Pope.---" Learning," says Lord Chesterfield, " is acquired by reading books.; but the more necessary
" study

CCXCVI.

Men and things have their particular point of view: to judge of some we should see them near; of others we judge best at a distance.

CCXCVII.

The truly honest man is he who valueth not himself on any thing.

CCXCVIII.

He must be a truly honest man who is willing to be always open to the inspection of honest men.

“sary learning, the knowledge of the world, is only to be acquired by reading men, and studying all the various editions of them.” Again. “All are in general, and yet no two in particular, exactly alike. Those who have not accurately studied, perpetually mistake: they do not discern the shades and gradations that distinguish characters seemingly alike, &c. &c.” Lett. 243d. “Let the great book of the world be your principal study.”

Lett. 217th.

CCXCIX.

A man of sense may love like a madman, but never like a fool.

MARRIAGE.

ccc.

There are convenient marriages, but no happy ones.

MEMORY.

ccci.

Why have we memory sufficient to retain the minutest circumstances that have happened to us; and yet not enough to remember how often we have related them to the same person?

MERIT.

cccii.

Those who think themselves persons of merit, take a pride often in being unlucky, in order to make themselves and others believe

believe that they are worthy to be the butt of fortune.

CCCIII.

To undeceive a person prejudiced in favour of his merit, is to do him the same bad office that was done to the madman at Athens, who fancied all the vessels that came into the port to be his own †.

CCCIV.

It is a sign of an extraordinary merit, when those who most envy it are forced to praise it.

CCCV.

Nature gives merit, and fortune sets it to work.

† This noble Athenian, when recovered from his indisposition, declared that he never had more pleasure than whilst he was distempered, which he remembered well. Adding, that his friends would have obliged him much, to have let him enjoy a happiness that put him in possession of all things, without depriving any body of the least.

Aelian tells this story, and calls him Thrasyllus.

CCCVI.

CCCVL.

Some people are disgusting with great merit ; others with great faults very pleasing †.

CCCVII.

There are people whose whole merit consists in saying and doing foolish things seasonably. An alteration of conduct would spoil all.

CCCVIII.

The art of setting off moderate qualifications steals esteem ; and often gives more reputation than real merit †.

† There are odious virtues, such as inflexible severity, and integrity that admits of no favour.

Tacit.

† Poppæus Sabinus, of moderate birth, obtained the consulship, and the honour of a triumph ; and governed for four and twenty years the greatest provinces, without any extraordinary merit : being just capable of his employments, and in no manner above them. Tacit.

CCCIx.

CCCIX.

Our merit procures us the esteem of men of sense, and our good fortune that of the public.

CCGX.

The appearance of merit is oftener rewarded by the world than merit itself.

CCCXI.

Merit has its season as well as fruit.

CCCXII.

We should not judge of a man's merit by his great qualities, but by the use he makes of them.

CCCXIII.

Censorious as the world is, it oftener does favour to false merit, than injustice to true.

MODERATION.

CCCXIV.

The moderation of happy people is
owing

owing to the calm that good fortune gives to their temper.

CCCXV.

Moderation is the dread of incurring that envy and contempt which attend upon the intoxication of prosperity: it is a vain ostentation of the strength of the mind. Moderation, is an exalted station, is the desire of appearing superior to fortune †.

CCCXVI.

We make a virtue of moderation, in order to bound the ambition of great men, and to comfort moderate geniuses for their slender fortune, and their slender merit.

CCCXVII.

Moderation resembles temperance. We are not unwilling to eat more, but are afraid of doing ourselves harm.

† You have so loaded me with honour and riches, that nothing can be wanting to my prosperity, unless it be moderation. Any thing more will but excite envy. Tacit,

NEGQ.

NEGOTIATION.

CCCXVIII.

We are often dissatisfied with those who negotiate our affairs. The reason is, they almost always sacrifice the interest of their friends to that of the success of the negotiation; this becomes their own interest, through the honour they expect for bringing to a conclusion what themselves have undertaken.

OBSTINACY.

CCCXIX.

Narrowness of mind is often the cause of obstinacy: we do not easily believe beyond what we see †.

OLD-AGE.

CCCXX.

Old-age is a tyrant, which forbids the pleasures of youth on pain of death.

† Dryden has very justly coupled obstinacy and error:

“Stiff in opinion, always in the wrong.”

N

CCCXXI.

CCCXXI.

Few people know how to be old.

CCCXXII.

Old-age gives good advice, when it is no longer able to give bad example.

OPPORTUNITY.

CCCXXIII.

Opportunities make us known to ourselves and others.

CCXXIV.

In affairs of importance we ought less to endeavour to make opportunities, than to use them when they offer.

CCCXXV.

All our qualities, both good and bad, are uncertain, dubious, and at the mercy of opportunity.

PASSIONS.

CCCXXVI.

The duration of our passions is no more
in

in our power than the duration of our lives.

CCCXXVII.

Passion often makes a fool of a man of sense: sometimes it makes a man of sense of a fool.

CCCXXVIII.

The passions are the only orators that always succeed. They are, as it were, Nature's art of eloquence, fraught with infallible rules. Simplicity, with the aid of the passions, persuades more than the utmost eloquence without it.

CCCXXIX.

In the heart of man there is a perpetual succession of the passions; so that the destruction of one is almost always the production of another.

CCCXXX.

Passions often beget their opposites; avarice produces prodigality, and prodigality avarice: men are often constant through weakness, and bold through fear.

CCCXXXI.

When we subdue our passions, it is rather owing to their weakness than our strength..

CCCXXXII.

So much injustice and self-interest enter into the composition of the passions, that it is very dangerous to obey their dictates ; and we ought to be on our guard against them even when they seem most reasonable.

CCCXXXIII.

Notwithstanding all the care we take to conceal our passions under the pretences of religion and honour, they still appear through the flimsy veil.

CCCXXXIV.

Absence destroys small passions, and increases great ones ; as the wind extinguishes tapers, and kindles fires.

CCCXXXV.

We are by no means aware how much we are influenced by our passions.

CCCXXXVI.

cccxxxvi.

While the heart is still agitated by the remains of a passion, it is more susceptible of a new one, than when entirely at rest.

cccxxxvii.

Those who are during life under the influence of strong passions are happy; and miserable when cured of them †.

PENETRATION.

cccxxxviii.

The great fault of penetration is, not the falling short of, but the going beyond its mark.

† Those who would eradicate all hopes and fears out of the human breast, as a means of happiness, are but ill acquainted with the economy of the mind. The inaction and apathy that are the necessary attendants on such a state would be greater evils than the most unbounded licence of the passions.

cccxxxix.

CCCXXXIX.

Penetration has an air of divination; it pleases our vanity more than any other quality of the mind.

PERSEVERANCE.

CCGXL.

Perseverance merits neither blame nor praise; it is only the duration of our inclinations and sentiments, which we can neither create nor extinguish.

PHILOSOPHERS.

CCGXL I.

The contempt of riches in the philosophers was a concealed desire of revenging on fortune the injustice done to their merit, by despising the good she denied them. It was a secret to shelter them from the ignominy of poverty; a bye-way to arrive at the esteem they could not procure by wealth †.

PIETY.

† According to Aristippus's repatee to Diogenes.

PIETY.

CCCXLI I.

The piety of old women is often a decent way of escaping the disgrace and ridicule attended on decayed beauty; an endeavour to continue themselves upon a respectable footing†.

PITY.

CCCXLI II.

Pity is the sense of our own misfortunes in those of another man; it is a wise foresight of the disaster that may befall ourselves: we assist others, in order to engage them to assist us on like occasions; so that

If Aristippus could be content with pulse, he would not haunt the tables of the great. If Diogenes could keep great men company, he would not live on pulse.

† It is also an employment for them; Mr. Hope has assigned them another.

“ See how the world its veterans rewards :

“ A youth of conquests, an old age of cards.”

the

the services we offer to the unfortunate are in reality so many anticipated kindnesses to ourselves †.

PLEASING.

CCCXLIV.

He who is pleased with nobody, is much more unhappy than he with whom nobody is pleased.

† "Grief for the calamity of another is pity; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also compassion, and, in the phrase of this present time, a fellow-feeling; and therefore for calamity, arising from great wickedness the best men have the least pity: and for the same calamity, those hate pity that think themselves least obnoxious to the same." Hobbes's *Leviathan*. And that celebrated sentence of Terence, *Homo sum, humani nihil alienum a me puto*, is indeed the same opinion, more concisely and mysteriously expressed: I am a man and feel for all mankind. Colman.

PRIDE.

CCCXLV.

Pride always indemnifies itself; and takes care to be no loser, even when it renounces vanity.

CCCXLVI.

If we were not proud ourselves, we should not complain of the pride of others.

CCCXLVII.

Pride is equal in all men; and differs but in the means and manner of shewing itself.

CCCXLVIII.

It seems as if nature, who has so wisely adapted the organs of our bodies to our happiness had with the same view given us pride, to spare us the pain of knowing our imperfections †.

† “ And pride bestow’d on all, a common friend;

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CCCXLIX.

CCCXLIX.

Pride is more concerned than benevolence in our remonstrances to persons guilty of faults ; and we reprove them not so much with a design to correct, as to make them believe that we ourselves are free from such failings.

CCCL.

Pride will not owe, and self-love will not pay.

CCCLI.

Our pride is often increased by what we retrench from our other faults.

CCCLII.

The same pride that makes us condemn the faults we imagine ourselves exempt from, inclines us to despise the good qualities we are not possessed of.

CCCLIII.

There is often more pride than goodness in our concern for the misfortunes of
our

our enemies. We make them feel our superiority, by shewing our compassion.

CCCLIV.

Nothing flatters our pride more than the confidence of the great, because we esteem it the effect of our own merit; not reflecting that it proceeds most frequently from their inability to keep a secret. So that confidence is sometimes a relief of mind, throwing off the oppressive load of secrecy.

CCCLV.

Pride has its caprice, as well as other passions; we are ashamed to own that we are jealous; yet value ourselves for having been so, and for being susceptible of it.

PROBITY.

CCCLVI.

It is difficult to determine, whether a clear, sincere, and honest procedure be the effect of probity or artifice.

MAXIMS.

PROMISES.

CCCLVII.

We promise according to our hopes,
and perform according to our fears.

PROPERTIES.

CCCLVIII.

Most men, like plants, have secret properties, which chance discovers.

PRUDENCE.

CCCLIX.

Prudence and love are inconsistent; in proportion as the last increases, the other decreases.

CCCLX.

No encomiums are thought too great for prudence; yet cannot it insure the least event.

PRAISE.

PRAISE.

CCCLXI.

The shame that arises from praise which we do not deserve, often makes us do things we should never otherwise have attempted.

CCCLXII.

We seldom heartily praise any but those who admire us.

CCCLXIII.

We blame ourselves only to extort praise.

CCCLXIV.

We are not fond of praising without a view to self-interest. Praise is an artful concealed refined flattery, which pleases very differently the giver and receiver: the one takes it as the reward of his merit, the other gives it to shew his candour and discernment.

CCCLXV.

We often use envenomed praise, which,
by

by a side-blow; exposes, in the person we commend, such faults as we durst not any other way lay open †.

CCCLXVI.

We seldom praise but to be praised.

CCCLXVII.

Few are so wise as to prefer useful reproof to treacherous praise ‡.

CCCLXVIII.

A refusal of praise is a desire to be praised twice.

CCCLXIX.

There are reproaches that praise, and praises that reproach ||.

† Panegyrist are the most dangerous enemies.

Tacit.

‡ Vitellius might have known the truth from the old officers; but his courtiers kept them off: having accustomed him not to hear any thing disagreeable, though useful; but to listen to every thing pleasing and pernicious. Id.

|| Pliny relates of Cæsar, that he blamed in so artful a manner, that he seemed to praise. Id.

CCCLXX.

CCCLXX.

That modesty which seems to decline praise, is only the desire of being praised more delicately.

CCCLXXI.

Ambition to merit praise fortifies our virtue. Praise bestowed on wit, valour, and beauty, contributes to their augmentation.

QUALITIES.

CCCLXXII.

Our bad actions expose us not to so much persecution and hatred as our good qualities †.

CCCLXXIII.

It is not enough to have great qualities ;

† The world is apt to judge unfavourably of eminent merit ; and a great reputation is as dangerous as a bad one. Tacit.

we must also have the management of them †.

CCCLXXIV.

There are some good qualities which, when natural, degenerate into faults ; and others which, when acquired, are always imperfect. For example, reason must teach us to be frugal of our fortune and our confidence ; and, on the contrary, nature must give us benevolence and valour.

CCCLXXV.

It is with some good qualities as with the senses ; they are incomprehensible and inconceivable to such as are deprived of them.

† Brutidius was possessed of good qualities sufficient to have raised him to the highest dignities, had he not through precipitation quitted the usual track ; labouring to outstrip first his equals, then his superiors : a rock on which many worthy men have split, while they strove at the greatest hazard to obtain prematurely, what with a little patience they would have had with perfect safety. Tacit.

CCCLXXVI.

CCCLXXVI.

Naturally to be without envy is a certain indication of great qualities.

CCCLXXVII.

There are bad qualities which constitute great talents.

QUARRELS.

CCCLXXVIII.

Quarrels would never last long, if the fault was on one side only.

RAILLERY.

CCCLXXIX.

Raillery is more insupportable than wrong; because we have a right to resent injuries, but it is ridiculous to be angry at a jest.

REASON.

CCCLXXX.

We want strength to act up to our reason.

CCCLXXXI.

A man is not rational because chance throws reason in his way: he only is rational who knows, distinguishes, tastes it.

CCCLXXXII.

We never desire ardently what we desire rationally.

RECONCILIATION.

CCCLXXXIII.

Reconciliation with enemies is owing to a desire of bettering our condition; the fatigue of war, and an apprehension of some untoward event.

REPENTANCE.

CCCLXXXIV.

Repentance is not so much remorse for what we have done, as the fear of consequences.

REPUTATION.

CCCLXXXV.

We except to judges in affairs of small moment,

moment, but are content that our reputation and glory should be dependent on the judgment of men who are all against us, through jealousy, prejudice, or want of discernment: yet it is merely to engage these to determine in our favour that we often hazard our ease and lives.

CCCLXXXVI.

Whatever ignominy we may have incurred, it is almost always in our power to re-establish our reputation †.

RICHES.

CCCLXXXVII.

Many people despise riches; yet few know how to bestow them.

† Particularly by a generous death: as Tacitus says of Sempronius: Though he had degenerated from his great ancestors by a disorderly life, he rendered himself worthy of them by his constancy in death.

CCCLXXXVIII.

Ridicule dishonours more than dishonour itself †.

SECRETS.

CCCLXXXIX.

How can we expect that another should keep our secrets, when it is more than we can do ourselves ‡.

SELF-LOVE.

CCCXC.

Self-love is more artful than the most artful of men.

CCCXCI.

Self-love is the greatest of flatterers.

CCCXCII.

The first impulse of joy we feel from the

† “Ridicule excites contempt and laughter, but can never be a detector of falsehood, or a test of truth.” Brown against Shaftesb.

‡ See Maxim cccli v.

good

good fortune of a friend proceeds neither from our good-nature, nor friendship; it is the effect of self-love, which flatters us either with the hope of being happy in our turn, or of making some advantage of his prosperity.

CCCXCIII.

Self-love, well or ill conducted, constitutes virtue and vice.

CCCXCIV.

Human prudence, rightly understood, is circumspect enlightened self-love.

CCCXCV.

We are so prepossessed in our own favour, that we often mistake for virtues those vices that have some resemblance to them, and which are artfully disguised by self-love.

CCCXCVI.

Notwithstanding all the discoveries that have been made in the regions of self-love, there still remains much *terra incognita*.

CCCXCVII.

CCCXCVII.

The fondness, or indifference for life, in the old philosophers, was a taste of their self-love; which ought no more to be controverted than the taste of the palate, or the choice of colours.

CCCXCVIII.

Nothing is so capable of diminishing our self-love, as the observation that we disapprove at one time of what we approve at another.

CCCXCIX.

Self-love never reigns so absolutely as in the passion of love: we are always ready to sacrifice the peace of those we adore, rather than lose the least part of our own.

CC.

The self-love of some people is such, that, when in love, they are more taken up with their passion than its object.

CCCC.

Self-love is the love of self, and of every thing

thing for the sake of self. Self-love makes men idolize themselves, and tyrannize over others, when fortune gives the means†. He never rests out of himself; and

† Self love.] Self-love is the spring of all animal action. It is implanted by nature in animals with a twofold view; the good of the individual, and that of the species: and operates on them by a twofold impulse; an insupportable uneasiness attendant on its suppression, and a pleasurable sensation annexed to its gratification. In brutes, this motive to action, being under the sole direction of instinct, is in general uniform and evident. In man, instinct has been superadded to reason, and self-love becomes complex and mysterious. It is plain from fact, that all animals are in some degree social; some of them, (if we may so speak) live under monarchical, some obligarchal, others democratical, and the rest patriarchal government. The stifling, or exerting, the principle that thus unites them, has always its concomitant pain or pleasure. And instinct, where she is sole governess, impells them invariably and unerringly to nature's end and their own good; which are always united, though not always absolutely the same. For example, animals eat to appease their hunger, or please their palate; they have no more view to sustenance than the sexes, in their intercourse, have to

and settles on external things, just as the bee doth on flowers, to extract what may be serviceable. Nothing is so impetuous

as

to propagation. Men too, so far as they act under instinct, act unerringly; when that leaves them, they have recourse to reason; which not being at all times, nor in all persons, equally right and strong, does not always prompt to what is equally true and just. Society is undoubtedly the interest of all mankind; and though an universal government has never yet been, nor most probably ever will be, formed, yet the wants of every man make him confederate with and join himself to, some particular public. Now, as in order to the establishment of a state it is indispensibly necessary to supersede some private rights, which are indeed compensated reflectively, though in a less obvious manner, this seems to produce cases wherein the good of the government and that of the subject clash. And certainly there are occasionally instances where the necessities of the commonwealth bear so hard on particular members as would give them a distaste to society did not the uniting principle, the love of the species, the affection for the community of which they are part, lighten the oppression, still the grievance, and, by benevolent reflection, even render it pleasurable. To actions deduced from this source, the self-love of the rest of the community

(which

as his desires, nothing so secret as his designs, nothing so artful as his conduct. His suppleness is inexpressible, his metamorphoses surpass those of Ovid, and his refinements those of chymistry. We cannot fathom the depth, nor penetrate the obscurity of his abyss. There concealed from the most piercing eye, he makes

(which reaps the benefit of these seeming self-sacrifices) ascribes extraordinary merit, annexes attendant glory, and calls them virtuous; which virtue, though, relatively to the kind, it be highly meritorious, is yet not disinterested, because repaid by the reflex pleasure of the actor: and may also be carried so far as to become irrational and vicious; for "to be virtuous," says Lord Shaftesbury, "is to have one's affections right in respect to one's self as well as of society." So that virtue will be found to be, not a disinterested benevolence toward the species, but a love of that kind which is its own reward; not a boundless enthusiasm for the public, but the social affection conducted by reason. It is rational humanity; it is, according to our author, well regulated self-love: And thus,

"True self-love and social are the same."

Pope's Essay on Man Ep. iv.

numberless turnings and windings: there is he often invisible even to himself: there he conceives, breeds, and brings up, without being sensible of it, an infinity of likes and dislikes; some of which are so monstrous, that he knows them not, when brought into light, or at least cannot prevail on himself to own them. From the night that envelops him springs the ridiculous notions he entertains of himself: thence his errors, his ignorance, his gross and silly mistakes with respect to himself. Thence is it that he imagines his sensations dead, when they are only asleep; that he shall never desire to run again when once tired; and that he has lost all the appetites he has sated. But this thick darkness, which hides him from himself, hinders him not from seeing perfectly well whatever is without him; in which he resembles the eye, that sees all things except itself. In his great concerns and important affairs, where the violence of desire summoneth his whole attention, he sees, perceives, understands, invents, suspects, penetrates,

penetrates, and divines, all things ; so that one would be tempted to believe that each passion had its respective magic. Nothing is so close and strong as his attachments ; which he in vain attempts to break through on discovery of the greatest impending misery. Yet sometimes, in a short time, he effects, and without trouble, what he had not been able to compass with the greatest efforts for years. Whence may well be concluded, that it is by himself that his desires are inflamed, more than by the beauty and merit of their objects ; that it is his taste that heightens and embellishes them that it is himself that he pursues ; and that he follows his inclination, when he follows things that are agreeable to his inclination. He is composed of contrarieties ; imperious and obedient ; sincere and hypocritical, merciful and cruel, timid and bold. He has different inclinations, according to the different tempers that possess and devote him, sometimes to glory, sometimes to wealth, sometimes to pleasure. These he

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changes

changes, as age and experience alter: and it is indifferent to him whether he has many inclinations, or only one; because he can split himself into many, or collect himself into one, as it is convenient or agreeable to him. ✓ He is inconstant: and the changes, besides those that happen from external causes, are numberless which proceed from himself. He is inconstant through levity, through love, through novelty, through satiety, through disgust, through inconstancy itself. He is capricious: and sometimes labours with eagerness and incredible pains to obtain things that are no ways advantageous, nay, even hurtful; but which he pursues merely because it is his will. He is whimsical, and often exerts his whole application in employments the most trifling; takes the utmost delight in the most insipid, and preserves all his haughtiness in the most contemptible. He is attendant on all ages and conditions; he lives every where; he lives on every thing; he lives.

lives on nothing. He makes himself easy either in the enjoyment, or privation of things; he even goes over to those who are at variance with him; he enters into their schemes, and, which is wonderful; along with them hates himself; he conspires his own destruction; he labours to undo himself; he only desires to BE; and, that granted, he consents to be his own enemy. We are not therefore to be surprised if he sometimes closes with the most rigid austerity; and enters boldly into a combination therewith to ruin himself; because what he loses in one place he regains in another. When we think he relinquishes his pleasures, he but suspends, or changes them: and even when he is discomfited, and we think we are rid of him, we find him triumphant in his own defeat. Such is self-love; of which man's life is only a long and great agitation. The sea is its representative: in the flux and reflux of whose waves, self-love may find a lively

ex-

expression of the turbulent succession of its thoughts, and of its eternal motion.

SENSATIONS.

CCCCII.

• It is less difficult to feign the sensations we have not, than to conceal those we have.

SIMPLICITY.

CCCCIII.

Affected simplicity is refined imposture †.

SINCERITY.

CCCCIV.

Sincerity is an openness of heart which is rarely to be found. It is commonly

† Domitian, under the mask of simplicity and modesty, affected the love of letters and poetry, the better to conceal his designs, and avoid his brother's jealousy. Tacit.

per-

MAXIMS.

117

personated by a refined dissimulation, whose end is to procure confidence.

CCCCV.

A desire to talk of ourselves, and to set our faults in whatever light we chuse, makes the main of our sincerity.

SLANDER.

CCCCVI.

We commonly slander more through vanity than malice.

SOBRIETY.

CCCCVII.

Sobriety is either the love of health, or an incapacity for debauch.

SOCIETY.

CCCCVIII.

Men would not live long in society, were they not the mutual dupes of each other.

SOUL

S O U L.

CCCCIX.

The health of the soul is as precarious as that of the body; for when we seem secure from passions, we are no less in danger of their infection, than we are of falling ill, when we appear to be well.

CCCCX.

There are relapses in the distempers of the soul, as well as in those of the body: thus we often mistake for a cure what is no more than an intermission, or a change of disease.

CCCCXI.

The flaws of the soul resemble the wounds of the body; the scar always appears, and they are in danger of breaking open again.

S U B T I L I T Y.

CCCCXII.

Too great subtilty is false delicacy; and true delicacy is solid subtilty.

T A L K A.

TALKATIVENESS.

ccccxiii.

We speak little when vanity prompts us not.

ccccxiv.

As it is the characteristic of great wits to say much in few words; so small wits seem to have the gift of speaking much and saying nothing.

ccccxv.

The excessive pleasure we find in talking of ourselves ought to make us apprehensive that it gives but little to our auditors.

ccccxvi.

We know that we should not talk of our wives; but we seem not to know that we should talk still less of ourselves.

ccccxvii.

We had rather speak ill of ourselves than not speak at all.

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ccccxviii.

ccccxviii.

It is never more difficult to speak well than when we are ashamed of our silence.

TASTE.

ccccxix.

It is as common for men to change taste, as it is uncommon for them to change their inclination.

ccccxx.

A good taste is the effect of judgment more than understanding.

ccccxxi.

We give up our interest sooner than our taste.

ccccxxii.

Our taste declines with our merit.

ccccxxiii.

Our self-love bears with less patience the condemnation of our taste than of our opinion.

TITLES.

TITLES.

ccccxxiv.

Titles, instead of exalting, debase those who act not up to them.

TREACHERY.

ccccxxv.

Men are oftener treacherous through weakness than design.

TRUTH.

ccccxxvi.

Truth is not so beneficial to men as its appearances are prejudicial.

ccccxxvii.

Our enemies, in their judgment of us, come nearer the truth than we do ourselves.

VALOUR.

ccccxxviii.

The love of glory, the fear of shame,
R 2 the

the design of making a fortune, the desire of rendering life easy and agreeable, and the humour of pulling down other people, are often the causes of that valour so celebrated among men.

ccccxxx.

Valour in private soldiers is a hazardous trade taken up to get a livelihood.

ccccxxx.

Perfect valour and perfect cowardice are extremes men seldom arrive at. The intermediate space is prodigious, and contains all the different species of courage, which are as various as mens faces and humours. There are those who expose themselves boldly at the beginning of an action; and who slacken and are disheartened at its duration. There are others who aim only at preserving their honour, and do little more. Some are not equally exempt from fear at all times alike. Others give occasionally into a general panic: others advance to the charge because they dare not stay in their posts. There are
men

men whom habitual small dangers encourage, and fit for greater. Some are brave with the sword, and fear bullets: others defy bullets, and dread a sword. All these different kinds of valour agree in this, that night, as it augments fear, so it conceals good or bad actions, and gives every one the opportunity of sparing himself. There is also another more general discretion: for we find those who do most, would do more still, were they sure of coming off safe: so that it is very plain that the fear of death gives a damp to courage†.

ccccxxxi.

Perfect valour consists in doing without witnesses all we should be capable of doing before the whole world.

ccccxxxli.

Most men sufficiently expose themselves in war to save their honour, but few so much as is necessary even to succeed in the design for which they thus expose themselves.

† Valour is the contempt of death and pain.

ccccxxxiii.

CCCCXXXIII.

No man can answer for his courage who has never been in danger.

CCCCXXXIV.

A wise man had rather avoid an engagement than conquer.

VANITY.

CCCCXXXV.

It is our own vanity that makes the vanity of others intolerable.

CCCCXXXVI.

If vanity really overturns not the virtues, it certainly makes them totter.

CCCCXXXVII.

The most violent passions have their intermissions: vanity alone gives us no respite.

CCCCXXXVIII.

The reason why the pangs of shame
and

and jealousy are so sharp, is this; vanity gives us no assistance in supporting them.

CCCCXXXIX.

Vanity makes us do more things against inclination than reason.

V I C E.

CCCCXL.

When our vices have left us, we flatter ourselves that we left them †.

CCCCXLI.

Vices enter into the composition of virtues, as poisons, into the composition of medicines. Prudence mixes and tempers, and makes good use of the compound against the ills of life.

CCCCXLII.

The reason we are not often wholly pos-

† The vices wait for us through life, like hosts with whom we are obliged successively to lodge; and it is uncertain whether experience would make us, avoid them, were we twice to take the same journey.

scised

possessed by a single vice, is, that we are distracted by several.

VIOLENCE.

CCCCXLIII.

The violence done us by others is often less painful than that we do to ourselves.

CCCCXLIV.

The violence we do ourselves in order to prevent love is often more rigorous than the cruelty of a mistress.

VIRTUE.

CCCCXLV.

Our virtues are commonly disguised vices.

CCCCXLVI.

What we mistake for virtue is often no more than a concurrence of divers actions and interests, which fortune, or industry, disposes to advantage. It is not always from the principles of valour and chastity that

that men are valiant, and that women are chaste.)

CCCCXLVII.

Prosperity is a stronger trial of virtue than adversity.†.

CCCCXLVIII.

The virtues are lost in interest, as rivers are in the sea.

CCCCXLIX.

To the honour of virtue it must be acknowledged, that the greatest misfortunes befall men from their vices.

CCCL.

We despise not all those who have vices; but we despise all those who have no virtues.

CCCLI.

Nature seems to have prescribed to every

† Prosperity is the touchstone of virtue; for it is less difficult to bear misfortunes than to remain uncorrupted by pleasure. Tacit.

man at his birth the bounds both of his virtues and vices.

CCCCLII.

Virtue would not go so far, if vanity did not bear her company †.

CCCCLIII.

Men dare not, as bad as they are, appear open enemies to virtue: when therefore they persecute virtue they pretend to think it counterfeit, or else lay some crime to its charge.

V O G U E.

CCCCLIV.

There are people, who, like new songs, are in vogue only for a time.

UNDERSTANDING.

CCCCLV.

Those are mistaken who imagine wit

† Take from men ambition and vanity, and you will have neither heroes nor patriots. Senec.

and

and judgment to be two distinct things. Judgment is only the perfection of wit, which penetrates into the recesses of things, observes all that merits observation, and perceives what seems imperceptible. We must therefore agree, that it is extensive wit which produces all the effects attributed to judgment.

CCCCCLVI.

Strength and weakness of mind are improper terms ; they are in reality only the good or ill disposition of the organs of the body.

CCCCCLVII.

It is a common fault to be never satisfied with our fortune, nor dissatisfied with our understanding.

CCCCCLVIII.

Politeness of mind consists in a courteous and delicate conception.

CCCCCLIX.

The gallantry of the mind consists in flattering agreeably.

CCCCCLX.

It often happens that things present themselves to our minds more finished than we could make them with much labour.

CCCCCLXI.

The defects of the mind, like those of the face, grow worse as we grow old.

CCCCCLXII.

A man of wit would be often at a loss, were it not for the company of fools.

CCCCCLXIII.

It is a better employment of the understanding to bear the misfortunes that actually befall us, than to penetrate into those that may.

CCCCCLXIV.

It is not so much through a fertility of invention that we find many expedients in any one affair; as through a poverty of judgment, which makes us listen to every thing that imagination presents, and hinders us from discerning what is best at first.

CCCCCLXV.

CCCCXLV.

Vivacity, when it increases with age, is not far short of phrenzy.

CCCCXLVI.

Those who have but one sort of wit are sure not to please long.

CCCCXLVII.

Wit tempts us sometimes to play the fool with great courage †.

CCCCXLVIII.

A man of sense finds less difficulty in submitting to a wrong-headed fellow than in attempting to set him right.

CCCCXLIX.

The labours of the body free men from

† “ Vivacity and wit make a man shine in company; but trite jokes and loud laughter reduce him to a buffoon,” Chesterff. Lett. (134th)

pains of the mind. This it is that constitutes the happiness of the poor †.

CCCCCLXX.

The mind, between idleness and constancy, fixes on what is easy and agreeable to it. This habit always sets bounds to our inquiries. No man was ever at the trouble to stretch his genius as far as it would go.

OCCCLXXI.

Small geniuses are hurt by small events :

† "It is certain that as in the body, when no labour of natural exercise is used, the spirits, which want their due employment, turn against the constitution, and find work for themselves in a destructive way ; so in a soul or mind, unexercised, and which languishes for want of action and employment, the thoughts and affections, being obstructed in their due course, and deprived of their natural energy, raise disquiet, and foment a rancorous eagerness and tormenting irritation. The temper from hence becomes more impotent in passion, more incapable of real moderation, and, like prepared fuel, readily takes fire by the least spark." Shaftesbury, vol. II. p. 160.

great.

great geniuses see through and despise them.

UNTRUTH.

CCCCLXXII.

Our aversion to untruth is often but an imperceptible ambition to make our testimony considerable, and to give our words a religious weight.

WEAKNESS.

CCCCLXXIII.

Weakness is the only incorrigible fault men have †.

† It is however a fault of nature, for which a man seems to be no more blameable than a vessel is for being leaky.

Lord Chesterfield observes, that men are more unwilling to have their weaknesses and imperfections known than their crimes: and that if you hint to a man that you think him ignorant, silly, or even ill-bred or awkward, he will hate you more and longer than if you tell him plainly you think him a rogue.

Lett. 129.

CCCCLXXIV.

CCCCLXXIV.

Weakness is more opposite to virtue than is vice itself.

CCCCLXXV.

Weak people are incapable of sincerity.

CCCCLXXVI.

More men are guilty of treason through weakness than any studied design to betray.

CCCCLXXVII.

If there be a man whose weak side has never been discovered, it is only because we have never accurately looked for it †.

† Lord Chesterfield says, that every body has a prevailing weakness; that Cardinal Richelieu, the ablest statesman, had the idle vanity to be thought the best poet too; that Sir Robert Walpole's prevailing weakness was to be thought to have a polite and happy turn to gallantry, of which he had undoubtedly less than any man living; and that those who had any penetration applied to it with success.

Lett. 97.

CCCCLXXVIII.

CCCCLXXVIII.

Silence is the happiest course a man can take who is diffident of himself.

WEARINESS.

CCCCLXXIX.

The reason why lovers are never weary of one another is this, they are always talking of themselves.

CCCCLXXX.

We often boast that we are never out of spirits; and yet are too much conceited to own that we are not bad company.

CCCCLXXXI.

We often forgive those who tire us, but cannot forgive those whom we tire.

CCCCLXXXII.

We are almost always tired with the company of those very persons of whom we ought never to be tired.

T

WILL.

WILL.

CCCCLXXXIII.

We have more power than will; and it is only to disculpate us to ourselves, that we often think things impracticable †.

WISDOM.

CCCLXXXIV.

Man's chief wisdom consists in knowing his follies.

CCCLXXXV.

Our wisdom is no less at fortune's mercy than our wealth.

CCCLXXXVI.

It is easier to be wise for others than for ourselves †.

† Our laziness persuades us that those things are impracticable which we might easily accomplish.

Tacit.

‡ Gods! that the nature of mankind is such,
To see and judge of the affairs of others
Much better than their own! Is't therefore so,
Because that in our own concerns we feel
Th' influence of joy and grief too nearly?

Terent.

CCCLXXXVII.

CCCCLXXXVII.

Wisdom is to the mind what health is to the body.

W O M A N.

CCCCLXXXVIII.

Women affect coyness as an addition to their beauty.

CCCCLXXXIX.

Women often fancy themselves to be in love when they are not. The amusement of an intrigue, the emotion of mind produced by gallantry, their natural passion for being beloved, and their unwillingness to give a denial; all these make them imagine they are in love, when in fact they are only coquetting.

CCCCXC.

Women are completely cruel only to those they hate.

CCCCXCI.

The wit of most women serves rather to fortify their folly than their reason †.

CCCCXCII.

† “ Women have an entertaining tattle, and sometimes wit; but for solid reasoning and good sense.

ccccxcii.

The virtue of women is often the love of reputation and quiet.

ccccxciii.

There are few virtuous women who are not weary of their profession.

ccccxciv.

Most virtuous women, like hidden treasures, are secure because nobody seeks after them.

ccccxcv.

Youth without beauty is of as little consequence as beauty without youth.

ccccxcvi.

The common foible of women who have been handsome, is to forget that they are now no longer so †.

ccccxcvii.

“sense, I never knew one in my life that had it,
“or who reasoned and acted consequently for
“four and twenty hours together.”

Ed. Chesterf. Lett. 129.

† “Every woman who is not absolutely ugly
“thinks herself handsome The suspicion of age no
“woman, let her be ever so old, ever forgives. No
“flattery is either too high or too low for them.
“They will greedily swallow the highest, and
“gratefully.

CCCCXCVII.

Most women yield more through weakness than passion; whence it happens that enterprising, rather than amiable men, commonly succeed best with them †.

CCCCXCVIII.

Of all the violent passions that which least misbecomes a woman is love.

“gratefully accept of the lowest; and you may safely flatter any woman, from her understanding down to the exquisite taste of her fan.”

Ld. Chesterf. Lett. 129, 181.

† “Whenever the slightest wishes arise,” says Lord Chesterfield, “the rest will soon follow.” Again, “If you are not listened to the first time, try a second, a third, and a fourth. If the place is not already taken, depend upon it it may be conquered.”

Lett. 218, 224.

It is difficult to say whether our author or Lord Chesterfield has been hardest upon the sex. His Lordship however (among other douceurs) acknowledges, “that women are the only refiners of the merit of men; that it is true they cannot add weight, but they polish and give a lustre to it; that they absolutely stamp every man’s character in the beau monde, and make it either current or cry it down, and stop it in payment.” Lett. 129,—218.

CCCCXCIX.

ccccxcix.

In their first desires women love the lover; afterwards the passion.

ccccc.

That woman is much to be pitied who at once possesses both love and virtue.

YOUTH.

ccccc.

Youth changes its inclinations through heat of blood; old age perseveres in it through habit.

ccccc.

Youth is continual intoxication. It is the fever of reason.

ccccc.

Young people at their entrance upon the world should be either bashful or giddy; a composed self-sufficiency generally turns to impertinence.

ccccc.

Timidity is a fault dangerous to reprehend in those we would reform.

THE END.

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